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50 Military Intelligence
People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, 
history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural 
groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at 
the broadest level, civilizations. People use politics not just to advance 
their interests but also to define their identity.
― Samuel P. Huntington 
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
Introduction
You are the unit intelligence officer and your boss has 
tasked you with generating a country study for country “X.” 
Your boss wants relevant information to help the decision-
making process. He doesn’t want the typical tourist snap-
shot you generated last time. He wants depth and rigor. 
He needs to know how the unit’s actions will influence the 
host nation government. What long-term effects will occur? 
Who are the key influencers in the government? How does 
the government and society function? What central levers 
exist to accomplish the objective? Too often, the focus is on 
the tactical and operational levels, and these domains take 
precedence over the strategic. An understanding of civil-
military relations can help provide the answers to the ques-
tions your boss didn’t know he needed.
Putting Civil-Military Relations in Perspective
The concept of civil-military relations is best understood 
as the space between the “P” and the “M” in the well-used 
acronym PMESII–PT.1 An understanding of a country’s po-
litical structure and personalities is a required first step. It 
is also necessary to understand the same for the nation’s 
military. The bare minimum intelligence analysis will high-
light these facts. It may even provide a historical timeline 
or predictions about the future. What is often lacking, how-
ever, is an understanding of how these categories interact. 
They are not separate entities, but rather a complex web 
of interconnected relationships. Capturing this dynamic will 
likely be far more valuable at the strategic level than know-
ing how many tanks a country has or that the country is a 
federal presidential republic. The study of civil-military rela-
tions can provide utility for intelligence professionals.
Where to begin? Civil-military relations is inherently an in-
terdisciplinary body of knowledge replete with theory and 
an ever-evolving set of tools that can be applied to describe 
phenomena as they occur. While the theoretical aspect 
largely resides in academia, the application is in practice ev-
ery day. The interaction between those responsible for gov-
erning and those responsible for defense is a paradox. Why 
should those with real power (weapons, tanks, planes, etc.) 
follow the directives of those without? What factors con-
tribute to the stability of this arrangement? How can exter-
nal forces or influences change this dynamic? The answer is 
different for every country.
Lessons from Our History and the Huntington 
Model 
The United States was founded on the principle of mili-
tary subordination to the democratically elected represen-
tatives of the people.2 George Washington explained the 
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importance of this model during his Newburgh Address in 
1783. He further demonstrated his belief in it by publicly re-
signing his commission before becoming the first President 
of the Republic. Throughout the next two centuries, the U.S. 
military would evolve into the professional force that it is 
today.
It is unfathomable to imagine the 82nd Airborne Division 
(or any other) marching on the Capitol to seize control. 
Instead, theorists of the U.S. civil-military model, commonly 
referred to as the Huntington model (conceived by Samuel 
P. Huntington, American political scientist, adviser, and aca-
demic) are concerned with degradations of the relationship 
on the margins. Discussions focus on topics such as, Should 
retired officers endorse presidential candidates or politi-
cal parties? Is there a growing civil-military divide? Again, 
these are threats to optimal civil-military relations, but they 
are not existential threats to the Nation. The Huntington 
model of objective control4 and others5 that have evolved 
from it are unique to the United States. Here is what Samuel 
Huntington wrote:
Subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the 
military, making them the mirror of the state. Objective civilian 
control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them 
the tool of the state. Subjective civilian control exists in a variety 
of forms, objective civilian control in only one. The antithesis of 
objective civilian control is military participation in politics: civilian 
control decreases as the military become progressively involved in 
institutional, class, and constitutional politics. Subjective civilian 
control, on the other hand, presupposes this involvement. The 
essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous 
military professionalism; the essence of subjective civilian control 
is the denial of an independent military sphere. Historically, the 
demand for objective control has come from the military profession, 
the demand for subjective control from the multifarious civilian 
groups anxious to maximize their power in military affairs.6
Every Country is Unique
Using the U.S. model to build a country study will likely 
result in flawed results. Every country has a unique history 
and culture from which its civil-military relations evolved. 
Comparative analysis to the U.S. model will be helpful for 
developing the questions to ask, but not from an evaluative 
perspective. The robust literature available in the United 
States is a necessary starting point for any intelligence pro-
fessional trying to understand civil-military relations. For 
example, comparative civil-military literature can help cre-
ate an exhaustive list of questions, which might include the 
following:
 Ê Do personal relationships exist between civilian leaders 
and military leaders?7
 Ê Does the military view themselves as the final arbiter of 
the political process?8
 Ê Does a distinction exist between military roles and 
missions?9
 Ê Is the military working to the fullest extent of its duty?10
 Ê Is the military competent to do what civilians ask it to 
do?11
 Ê Are the civilians the ones making key substantive policy 
decisions?12
 Ê Do civilians decide which decisions civilians make and 
which the military make?13
 Ê Is the military avoiding any behavior that undermines 
civilian supremacy in the long run?14
 Ê Is civilian authority internalized in the military as a set 
of strongly held beliefs and values?15
 Ê Do civilians exhibit due regard for the military (re-
spect military honor, expertise, autonomy, and political 
neutrality)?16
 Ê Is there low frequency of interference by civilians on 
military autonomy and exclusiveness?17
 Ê Is the relationship between the military and civilian in-
stitutions functional (i.e., not strained)?18
 Ê Is the military primarily used as an instrument of na-
tional defense (not used for nation building)?19
 Ê Is there close affinity between the military and 
bureaucrats?20
The Newburgh Address
On March 15, 1783, General George Washington made 
a surprise appearance at an assembly of Army officers at 
Newburgh, New York, to calm the growing frustration and 
distrust they had been openly expressing toward Congress 
in the previous few weeks. Angry with Congress for failing 
to honor its promise to pay them and for its failure to settle 
accounts for repayment of food and clothing, officers began 
circulating an anonymous letter condemning Congress and 
calling for a revolt. When word of the letter and its call for an 
unsanctioned meeting of officers reached him, Washington 
issued a general order forbidding any unsanctioned meetings 
and called for a general assembly of officers for March 15. 
At the meeting, Washington began his speech to the officers 
by saying, “Gentlemen: By an anonymous summons, an at-
tempt has been made to convene you together; how incon-
sistent with the rules of propriety! How unmilitary! And how 
subversive of all order and discipline…” Washington contin-
ued by pledging, “to exert whatever ability I am possessed 
of, in your favor.” He added, “Let me entreat you, gentlemen, 
on your part, not to take any measures, which viewed in the 
calm light of reason, will lessen the dignity, and sully the glory 
you have hitherto maintained; let me request you to rely on 
the plighted faith of your country, and place a full confidence 
in the purity of the intentions of Congress.”3
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 Ê Are there constitutional constraints on the political im-
pact of the military?21
 Ê Do the normal constitutional channels function?22
 Ê Is public attachment to civilian institutions strong?23
The answers to these questions can fill that space be-
tween the “P” and “M” of PMESII–PT. They help describe 
the function and structure of a government with greater ac-
curacy than the standard method. They help illuminate the 
relevant interactions between a country’s military and its 
leaders. Understanding this interaction is critical to devel-
oping courses of action that will have strategic effects.
How does one accurately answer the above questions? 
Most militaries around the world do not have professional 
journals that regularly publish articles highlighting civil-mil-
itary relations. The United States is unique in this regard. 
Most countries’ militaries have a culture against discussing 
their relationship with the civilian government. Journalists, 
academics, and think tanks can provide useful information; 
however, these sources are often biased or misinformed. 
The resourceful intelligence professional will be able to find 
a way to reliably answer the questions derived from com-
parative civil-military relations literature.
Conclusion
Leveraging civil-military relations theory will better facili-
tate a strategic understanding of examined countries. At a 
minimum, it will provide a more robust country analysis. It 
will also likely lead to a more informed and deliberate de-
cision-making process. The intricacies of the relationship 
between a country’s military and civilian leadership reveal 
how the country is actually governed. They reveal power 
dynamics, explain why certain events occur, help forecast 
conditions when the inputs change, reveal preferences, and 
help identify where to apply limited resources. Your boss 
didn’t know he needed to know these things, but he will be 
more effective when you reveal them to him. It’s your job 
as an intelligence professional to leverage the utility of civil-
military relations.
Epigraph
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1997), 21.
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